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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent months, a number of commentators have called for the abo-
lition-or very substantial retrenchment-of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC or Commission).' Last October, four new FCC Com-
missioners, including a new Chairman, completed an extraordinary con-
* Principal, Strategic Policy Research, Inc., Bethesda, Md.; B.A., Harvard University,
1968; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1975. The Author also served as Chief
Counsel to the Subcommittee on Communications, U.S. House of Representatives (1975-
1980) and as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University Law Center (1976-1991). The
Author wishes to acknowledge his colleague John Haring, formerly Chief of the FCC's Of-
fice of Plans and Policy, for his intellectual contributions to this Article and his colleague
Kirsten Pehrsson, J.D., George Mason University, 1994, for her overall assistance.
1. See Peter Huber, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE: ABOLISH THE FCC AND LET
COMMON LAW RULE THE TELECOSM (1997); Thomas G. Krattenmaker, The Telecommuni-
cations Act of 1996, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1996); HERITAGE FOUNDATION, ROLLING BACK
GOvERNMENT (1995); PROGRESS AND FREEDOM FOUNDATION, THE TELECOM REVOLUTION:
AN AMERICAN OPPORTUNTY (1995).
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firmation process which saw them grilled on issues ranging from universal
service to spectrum auctions; hauled into senators' private offices for
meetings to discuss pending administrative proceedings and litigation
strategy; and subjected to all manner of "holds" before finally being ap-
proved by voice votes or, in the case of the Chairman, a recorded vote of
99 to 1. Heightened scrutiny, if not downright bludgeoning, of would-be
commissioners by Congress was directed against what was, arguably, by
U.S. standards, the most qualified slate of FCC nominees ever proposed by
an administration-consisting of the FCC's general counsel, a congres-
sional staff economist with real expertise in the subject matter, a former
state regulator, and a former Justice Department antitrust lawyer.
There is more than a little irony in all of this furor over one of the
oldest of the so-called "alphabet agencies." Calls for eliminating the FCC
come at a time when the agency is in the process of implementing the mas-
sive Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Act or 1996 Act).'
The old adage that "where one stands depends on where one sits"
certainly holds true with respect to reform of the FCC. In essence, the de-
bate is between those who hold what might be termed the traditional lib-
eral view and those who are conservatives, or "second-look" liberals. The
former are skeptical of marketplace forces and confident of the abilities of
regulators to out-perform markets. They favor an expansive, intervention-
ist regulatory agency with broad legislative authority. The latter believe
the industry should be governed by consumer-citizen preferences reflected
through markets and therefore favor a more limited, less intrusive agency
which essentially administers and implements policy established by Con-
gress.' What constitutes "undue" process, overlapping jurisdiction, redun-
dant regulation, and unnecessary expenditures for the latter are seen as im-
portant safeguards and processes by the former.
Notwithstanding these philosophical differences, there are, especially
in this period of budget constraints, legitimate questions about how the
modern FCC should be structured, and how much process and regulation
we can afford. In large part, it is a question of establishing administrative
priorities; that is, doing the things that have to be done-and have to be
done by the federal regulator. The 1996 Act has established new priorities
2. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
3. Of course, few people fall neatly into one category or the other. For example, one
may believe marketplace forces are adequate to ensure the presentation of diverse view-
points in mass media markets but favor government intervention to ensure (subsidize) uni-
versal telephone service. This has resulted in collective support, at least among politicians,
for the traditional liberal view of regulation (and government generally) and explains why
basic reforms have been rarely recommended and difficult to achieve.
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for the FCC which, along with spectrum allocation, should be where the
Commission directs its "scarce" resources.
Like it or not-and one's views on whether we need an FCC are dif-
ficult to disentangle from what one thinks about the agency's personalities
and policies-the FCC is not going away any time soon. There are legiti-
mate needs for a federal telecommunications regulator, at least for the
foreseeable future. Focusing on elimination of the FCC is doubly danger-
ous. First, it needlessly polarizes the debate about FCC reform-a debate
which certainly is important and long overdue. Second, it tends to mini-
mize other approaches to major structural reform of the agency which are
more relevant and at least relatively more realistic.
On the other hand, upon careful consideration, the spectacle of quali-
fied nominees running the gauntlet of conflicting political agendas under
the guise of advice and consent reveals serious flaws in the traditional
structure of the agency. Much of the Congressional concern about the FCC
goes to the agency's accountability. Every legislator wants the FCC to be
mindful of his or her views and constituent interests. Yet, under the tradi-
tional model, accountability tends to be achieved at the expense of effec-
tiveness. Accountability often means making it difficult for the agency to
do the "wrong thing" and, as a result, making it virtually impossible for it
to do the "right thing." This might be termed "negative accountability," or
accountability by stalemate and paralysis. In the discourse about FCC re-
form, little has been said about changes that might result in "positive ac-
countability," that is, accountability without the adverse effects of the cur-
rent system.
Agreeing that there is a need for an FCC does not imply that the FCC
we need is one structured as the agency is today. Indeed, this article pro-
4. While this Article focuses on the governance structure for the agency (i.e., whether
it can be more effective and efficient headed by a single administrator than a multimember
commission), there are obviously other "structural" issues that should be considered.
One area which should be carefully examined is the FCC's jurisdiction over mergers,
at least those that do not involve the transfer of broadcast licenses. In the general economy,
mergers are reviewed by one or more antitrust authorities (e.g., the Department of Justice,
the Federal Trade Commission, and various state attorneys general). The focus of these
authorities is on whether a proposed merger or acquisition would lessen competition in the
relevant market. However, when a merger is proposed involving firms which hold spectrum
licenses, the FCC must give its approval as well, determining whether the transfer of control
of the licenses is "in the public interest." The question is: What does this additional layer of
review add, or why do we treat firms that use the spectrum differently from those that use
newsprint, memory chips, or steel to produce a product or render a service?
The legal theory is that the use of the spectrum carries with it some special responsi-
bilities and obligations. This theory also holds that the spectrum "belongs to the people"
and that licensees use it only as "public trustees." This thinking has its roots in the govern-
ment's administration of broadcast spectrum, where, early on, the decision was made to
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poses a fairly radical reform-replacing the multimember FCC with a sin-
gle administrator.5 The objective of this reform is to reduce costs (both di-
rect and indirect), improve the quality of decisions, and promote positive
accountability. While this Article acknowledges the pros and cons, it does,
in the end, strongly advocate change.
II. A SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE FCC
After a brief attempt at informal regulation of the radio spectrum by
the Commerce Department,6 Congress, in 1927, established the Federal
Radio Commission (FRC) and gave it authority to regulate the use of the
spectrum. The FRC could issue a license in any case where it determined
"the public interest, necessity or convenience would be served." 7 While
the 1927 Radio Act barred the new FRC from engaging in censorship, it
did restrict licensees' use of the airwaves, including a requirement of
award licensees by regulatory process rather than by market mechanisms. The theory that
supported broadcast licensing became the theoretical foundation for the licensing of all
spectrum (e.g., business radio, private microwave, etc.). The FCC's authority in this respect
has never been seriously reviewed by Congress. See generally THOMAS G. KRATENMAKER
& LUCAS A. POWE, REGULATORY BROADCAST PROGRAMMING (1994).
Of course, a number of things have changed since the 1920s which call into question
the continued relevance of the underlying theory and certainly its expansion by the FCC
over the years to form a basis for agency review of telecom mergers. First, there is the fun-
damental question of whether use of nonbroadcast spectrum should be governed by the
same theory as broadcast spectrum. In reality, applications for the use of most nonbroadcast
spectrum are routine. Rules relating to allowable levels of power, coverage area, and so
forth are straightforward. Does the use of a business radio license to dispatch trucks on
service calls, a microwave license to transport cable programming or telephone calls, or a
satellite license to send and receive data require a finding, even in the first instance, that the
user is an appropriate public trustee?
The FCC has, nevertheless, used this rather small hook to hang up some very big
mergers. For example, in 1997, the FCC refused to approve the merger of Bell Atlantic and
NYNEX, which had been approved by the Justice Department and a number of state regu-
latory commissions, until the companies agreed to certain conditions which the Commission
proposed relating to local competition. The FCC Chairman also took the unusual step of
opposing a possible merger of AT&T and SBC, before it was even formally announced by
the parties.
5. At a 1996 Senate hearing on FCC oversight and reform at which the Author testi-
fied, Albert Halprin, former Chief of the FCC's Common Carrier Bureau, also advocated
the move from a multimember Commission to a single administrator. While not specifically
endorsing a single administrator, Dennis Patrick, a former FCC Chairman, testified to the
need to reduce the size of the Commission. Federal Communications Commission Over-
sight and Reform: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Trans-
portation, 104th Cong. (1996).
6. See United States v. Zenith Radio Corp., 12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill., 1926); see also
R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959).
7. Radio Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162, repealed by Communications Act of
1934, ch. 652, § 602(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.A. (West 1991 & Supp. 1997)).
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"equal opportunities" for political candidates. The FRC was created with
five members, in part to avoid the "political interference or arbitrary con-
trol" that might result from a single administrator.8
In 1934, the Roosevelt administration sought legislation to transfer
the FRC's powers to a new seven-member Federal Communications
Commission that was also to be given jurisdiction over the telephone and
telegraph industries, which was being exercised at the time largely by the
Interstate Commerce Commission. The new statute, enacted within several
months after it was submitted, was largely a recodification of the 1927 Ra-
dio Act and the Interstate Commerce Act.
In the sixty-four years since the FCC was established, it seems to
have been taken for granted that the traditional multimember structure is
the most efficient and effective.9 The major reviews of the independent
regulatory commissions (including the FCC) did not directly address this
issue, although they did identify a number of structural and procedural
problems with these agencies.' °
One such review was completed in 1949 by a commission headed by
former President (and Commerce Secretary) Herbert Hoover." In 1960,
retired Federal Judge James Landis compiled a report on the regulatory
agencies for President-elect John F. Kennedy. 2 Finally, in 1971, the Presi-
8. See ERWIN G. KRASNOW Er AL., THE PoLms OF BROADCAST REGULATION 12 (3d
ed. 1982) (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-772, at 2 (1926)). In a 1930 law review article, the
Chairman of the American Bar Association's Committee on Communications, a former
General Counsel of the FRC, called for a "Radio Czar" rather than a commission, express-
ing a concern that a multimember commission "would inevitably clash and would neutralize
each other." Louis G. Caldwell, The Standard of Public Interest, Convenience or Necessity
as Used in the Radio Act of 1927, 1 AiR L. REv. 295, 296 (1930).
9. This is the case despite the fact that during this period a number of regulatory bod-
ies headed by a single administrator were created (e.g., the Environmental Protection
Agency). There does not appear to be a clearly stated or consistent rationale for choosing
one structure over the other.
10. The structure of the FCC became a legislative issue, when Congress first began to
address the need for revamping the Communications Act in the late 1970s. At that time,
legislation proposed in the House of Representatives included provisions that would have
renamed the agency and reduced the number of commissioners to five. While complete re-
writes of the 1934 Act were not enacted at that time, portions of the proposed bills eventu-
ally found their way into law or regulation, including the reduction in the number of com-
missioners. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-253, 96 Stat.
763. However, to date, Congress has not considered replacing the multimember FCC with a
single administrator.
11. See COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT,
THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1949) [hereinafter
HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT].
12. SUBCOMMITrrE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE
PRESIDENT-ELECT (Comm. Print 1960) (authored by James M. Landis) [hereinafter LANDIS
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dent's Advisory Council on Executive Organization-popularly referred to
as the Ash Council-examined the independent regulatory agencies.13
The Hoover Commission Report focused on organizational issues
related to the independent agencies. The Report did not directly address
the issue of a single administrator versus a multimember commission, but
did find that administration of an agency was "distinctly superior" when
vested in the chairman and urged the appointment of an executive director
to support the chairman.14 In addition to improving the efficiency of the
agency, this approach would also "center responsibility for the functioning
of the commission" (i.e., improve accountability)." In that same vein, the
Hoover Commission Report viewed the chairman as the agency's
"principal spokesman before the Congress as well as before the executive
branch."'
16
The key reforms proposed by Landis were (1) to increase the author-
ity of the chairman of each agency; and (2) to increase the accountability
of each chairman to the President. 17 In these respects, Landis, like the
Hoover Commission, clearly favored the "strong chairman" (or primus in-
ter pares) model. Interestingly, Landis was unwilling to take the next step
along the continuum-a single administrator.
The Landis Report skirted some other tough issues. For example, in a
section entitled "Administrative Organization," Landis acknowledged pro-
posals to separate "policy" functions from adjudicatory functions. How-
ever, he ultimately believed that the regulatory process was too complex to
make such simple distinctions." Moreover, Landis concluded that it was
"unsafe to speculate broadly upon the appropriate organization of the
regulatory agencies ' 9 because the industries they regulate are so different.
This conclusion begs the question of how each agency might be better
structured to deal with its particular mandate. This question is even more
pertinent when, as arguably with the FCC today, the mandate changes over
time.
REPORT].
13. PRESIDENT'S ADVISORY COUNCIL ON EXECUTIVE ORGANIZATION, A NEW
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: REPORT ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT REGULATORY AGENCIES
(1971) [hereinafter ASH COUNCIL REPORT].
14. HOOVER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 11, at 5-6.
15. Id. at 6.
16. Id. The Commission also recommended that members of all independent agencies
be removed only for cause and called for a change in the statute to extend this protection to
the FCC. Id.
17. LANDIS REPORT, supra note 12, at 65.




While Landis focused primarily on internal organizational issues, he
did touch on matters which bear directly on the structural reform recom-
mended in this Article. Landis noted that the sheer volume and complexity
of decisions agencies are called upon to make mean that commission
members must delegate much of the decision-making process to staff.
With a bluntness that typifies his report, Landis wrote that, unlike federal
judges, commissioners "do not do their own work. The fact is that they
simply cannot do it."20 He noted that "delegation on a wide scale, not pat-
ently recognized by the law, characterizes the work of substantially all the
regulatory agencies .... Absent such delegation, the work of these agen-
cies would grind to a stop."2' Landis suggested that "[t]he real issue... is
whether to recognize openly this fact of delegation or continue with the
present facade of non-delegation .... "22
If the effective operation of the FCC entails delegation of decision
making and opinion writing to staff and means that commissioners are of-
ten left to "rubber stamp" deals worked out at the staff level, there appears
to be less need for a multimember structure. A proficient, expert staff di-
rected by a highly competent administrator might be expected to produce
decisions that are at least no worse than those produced by a multimember
agency. The real questions, then, are what benefits, if any, result from the
participation of other commissioners (or, more accurately, their staff) in
formulating agency decisions, whether those benefits are more apparent
than real, and what costs are associated with the multimember structure.23
In a section dealing with the FCC, Landis was especially harsh.
While praising the "technical excellence" of its staff, he criticized the
Commission for inaction, susceptibility to influence by ex parte contacts
(i.e., "capture" by the regulated industry, especially the broadcast net-
works), and subservience to Congress.24 After such a strong indictment,
Landis offered only a modest remedy-providing the FCC with "strong
and competent leadership."5
20. Id. at 19.
21. Id. at 20.
22. Id.
23. The Landis Report also found considerable overlapping jurisdiction among regula-
tory agencies, principally in the area of antitrust. Landis cited the FCC's jurisdiction over
issues of "monopoly" as one example. He recommended better coordination or simply
eliminating the overlaps. Id. at 29, 86; see also supra note 4 (discussing FCC review of
telecommunications mergers).
24. LANDIS REPORT, supra note 12, at 53-54.
25. Id. at 54. President Kennedy certainly followed this advice by nominating Newton
Minow as Chairman. Minow proved himself to be one of the most competent and contro-
versial Chairmen in the agency's history. He was also willing to take on the broadcasters as
evidenced by his famous "vast wasteland" speech delivered to the National Association of
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In 1971, the Ash Council completed its review of the independent
agencies. Like its predecessors, the Ash Council report focused on issues
such as the quality of appointments and concerns about "industry capture."
However, the report recommended no changes in the bipartisan, mul-
timember structure of the FCC.'
Given the time that has passed since the last thorough review of the
independent regulatory agencies generally, and in light of the passage of
the 1996 Act, it is timely to reconsider the structure of the FCC.
H1I. THE CASE FOR A SINGLE ADMINISTRATOR
The case for reform of the FCC must start with an assessment of the
appropriate role for federal regulation in the modern telecommunications
and mass media environment. In other words, structure should be derived
from mandate, rather than the other way around.
The structure of the FCC should be that which is most relevant to car-
rying out its responsibilities effectively and efficiently. 27 Since the FCC's
authority has changed significantly, especially within the last decade, it is
timely to review the agency's structure. In particular, the FCC's chief tasks
today include implementation and enforcement of the clear procompetitive
policy set out in the 1996 Act. The FCC is also responsible for adminis-
tering spectrum auctions, including auctions for new broadcast spectrum,
and enforcing the terms of spectrum licenses. While Congress has still left
a great deal to the agency's discretion,2 it has clearly established the major
Broadcasters' convention in 1961.
26. ASH COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 13, at 14.
27. It is precisely for this reason that proposals to abolish the FCC are so irrelevant.
Congress has given the FCC a large amount of work to implement the 1996 Act, leaving
many important details to be worked out by the expert agency.
28. Congress should also consider whether "the public interest" standard for decision
making is too vague and leaves too much discretion with the FCC. This is not a new con-
cern, especially as it relates to FCC regulation of broadcast speech. See Glen 0. Robinson,
The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of Radio and Television
Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67, 125 (1967) ("Perhaps more basically troublesome than
the encouragement of conformity is the fact that it is impossible to tell whether the Com-
mission is in fact making value judgments about programming while its published opinions
deny that it is doing so."); David L. Bazelon, FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications
Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213, 215 ("The licensing scheme mandated by the Federal Commu-
nications Act permits a wide-ranging and largely uncontrolled administrative discretion in
the review of telecommunications programming. That discretion has been used, as we might
expect and as traditional First Amendment doctrine presumes, to apply sub silentio pressure
against speech .... ). As yet another commentator has noted:
It is hard to reconcile such governmentally imposed requirements with the tradi-
tional concept of the freedom of the press. The broadcast model assumes that the
government has a positive role to play as licensor and regulator. The optimistic
notion that government is to play that role on behalf of citizen freedom rather
[Vol. 50
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tasks the FCC must perform.29 The question is whether a single adminis-
trator or a multimember Commission is better suited to carry out these re-
sponsibilities.
The answer requires analysis along three relative dimensions: cost,
effective decision making, and accountability.
A. Costs
The relative costs of a single administrator and a multimember
Commission are important considerations. 30 Any proper cost-benefit analy-
sis identifies beneficial and adverse consequences of a particular approach
to determine the existence and magnitude of any net benefits, and then
compares net benefits with added costs.
Any multimember commission starts out in a hole, so to speak, since
it clearly entails additional costs and, thus, must produce sufficient net
benefits to cover those added costs. The costs involved are both direct and
indirect. Examples of direct costs are each additional commissioner's sal-
ary and benefits (health, retirement, etc.), office space, personal staff com-
pensation, and travel expenses. Estimates of these costs in the case of the
FCC amount to about one million dollars annually for each commis-
sioner's office.
There are also greater indirect costs with the multimember structure.
The costs of simply reaching a decision, let alone achieving consensus or
unanimity, clearly increase as the number of decision makers increases.
Collective decision making entails interoffice coordination, negotiations,
and multiple consultations with agency staff, as well as the costs of hold-
ing official meetings (e.g., meeting room, sound system, provision for
telecast, and overflow seating). Another considerable indirect cost is the
delay associated with gaining support for a particular outcome.
In addition, costs of private parties and other governmental authori-
ties with stakes in the regulatory decisions are also greater. Interested par-
ties will typically lobby multiple offices and incur the costs of "tailoring"
their messages rather than simply filing generic comments with the
agency.
than against it is not persuasive to those who are skeptical about the power of
good will in political processes to guarantee good results.
ITHIELDESOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OFFREEDOM 135 (1983).
29. For example, the FCC is required to oversee the establishment of prices for
"unbundled network elements" and to implement the new universal service mandate of the
1996 Act. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 101(a), § 251, 47 U.S.C.A. § 251 (West
Supp. 1997).
30. Costs, in this context, refer to the resources needed to operate the agency rather
than any adverse consequences that flow from operating in a particular fashion.
Number 3]
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Costs incurred in identifying, screening (FBI background checks,
etc.), and confrmiing suitable candidates to fill added commissioner slots
are also multiplied. This process often involves trading political favors
with key legislators who will be called upon to confirm the nominations
and, as a result, can produce delays until acceptable combinations of
nominees are proposed.3'
In the latter regard, while it is a point that bears on the substantive
consequences of having a multimember commission, there are likely to be
considerable differences in the selection and confirmation process under a
multi- versus single administrator regime. In either case, the process is, by
nature, a political exercise. Candidates tend to be people with political
connections, often having worked directly in political campaigns or in pro-
fessional staff positions for politically prominent individuals. 32 This is not
to say, however, that the political dynamics of the two processes are com-
parable.
Consider the following example. In 1969, President Nixon nominated
Dean Burch, the former Chairman of the Republican National Committee
and a prot6g6 of the ultra-conservative Senator Barry Goldwater, to be
FCC Chairman. In 1993, President Clinton selected Reed Hundt, a Wash-
ington lawyer with very close political and fundraising ties to Vice Presi-
dent Al Gore, to head the agency. While both Burch and Hundt were suc-
cessfully confirmed (and proved to be distinguished, if controversial,
Chairmen), it is far less likely that they would have survived the process
(or have been nominated in the first place) had there not been other mem-
bers of the Commission to counterbalance them.
While having a single administrator will not necessarily ensure a less
political selection process, it can be expected that, at least over time, the
criteria used for selection of a single administrator would comport more
closely with position-relevant characteristics. For example, it has been
31. Frequently during the last decade, the FCC has operated for substantial periods of
time with less than a full complement of commissioners for political reasons.
32. In the 1970s, the Senate Commerce Committee commissioned an analysis of ap-
pointments to the FCC and Federal Trade Commission which found that: "Partisan political
considerations dominate the selection of regulators to an alarming extent. Alarming in that
other factors-such as competence, experience, and even, on occasion, regulatory philoso-
phy-are only secondary considerations." SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, 94TH CONG., 2D
SESS., APPOINTMENTS TO THE REGULATORY AGENCIES: THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION AND THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1949-1974) 391 (Comm. Print 1976)
(prepared by James M. Graham & Victor H. Kramer). There has been considerable criticism
over the years (by the American Bar Association, among others) of the quality of regulatory
appointments. To the extent the problem is endemic to the U.S. political system, it may be
too much to expect nominees who are completely "above politics." However, in view of the
likely outcome, it is desirable to have an agency structure that enhances accountability and
efficient, timely decision making.
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generally true that the Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust has been an
antitrust or industrial organization expert?3 On the other hand, it has been
rare that an FCC commissioner, let alone a chairman, had significant expe-
rience in telecommunications or even in the direct management of a large
organization.
As noted, with multimember commissions, "strategic" selections are
much more likely; that is, selections which satisfy particular political in-
terests or offset (neutralize) other commission members. When there is
more than one opening, the tendency is to put together a slate of candidates
who collectively can pass political muster and can be expected to cancel
each other out.34 With expectations such as these, it is hardly surprising to
see sometimes bitter and often intensely personal, rivalries surface, which
do little to improve the quality of life or of substantive decisions at the
FCC.35 The result is the politicization of otherwise nonpolitical
("technical") issues and decisions.
B. Decision Making
The analysis of the impact of the two approaches on decision making
is more complex and tends to be more subjective. There are two ways in
which a multimember structure can affect the quality of decisions made by
the agency. First, individual commissioners may contribute to better deci-
sions by force of intellect, professional training, and experience. Multiple
members bring a diversity of viewpoints. Second, having multiple com-
missioners may reduce the likelihood of "bad" decisions by exercising a
check on any single administrator, especially the chairman.36
33. See William E. Kovacic, The Quality of Appointments and the Capability of the
Federal Trade Commission, 49 ADMIN. L. REv. 915, 948 (1997) ("Replacing a multi-
member structure with a smaller number of commissioners or a single administrator proba-
bly increases the likelihood that more nominees will be highly qualified.").
34. Id. at 948-49.
There are several approaches for improving the quality of regulatory agency ap-
pointments. One approach is to... convert multi-member commission structures
to leadership by one administrator. [This] curbs the ability of Congress or the ex-
ecutive branch to endorse candidates with weak qualifications. As the number of
commission members declines, it becomes more difficult for the President to jus-
tify poor appointments by arguing that at least some commissioners are qualified
and can be relied upon to guide the agency on matters of substance.
Id.
35. See In-Fighting at FCC Grows Hotter with Exchange of Contentious E-Mail,
WASH. TELECOM WK., Sept. 26, 1997, at 1; Quello Fires Final Blast at Chmn. Hundt on
First Amendment Issues, CoMM. DAILY, Oct. 27, 1997; Chris McConnell, Quello Fires at
Hundt, BRDcsT. & CABLE, June 30, 1997, at 24; Quello Blasts Hundt on First Amendment
Views, COMM. DAmY, June 27, 1997; Harry A. Jessell, Family Feud at the FCC, BRDcST. &
CABLE, Dec. 23, 1991, at 4.
36. For a period of 17 months during 1987 to 1989, as a result of unfilled vacancies,
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Does a multimember structure result in more "good" decisions? In
the case of the modem FCC, it is not at all clear that it does. As noted,
most decisions are prepared by the staff, usually in consultation with the
chairman's office. Typically, other commissioners have little input until a
draft "item" is circulated prior to adoption. Even at that point, individual
commissioners (including the chairman) have little actual input into the
document.
Commissioners obviously have leverage. The fact that the chairman
needs a majority and/or may want to appease a particular interest group or
key politician with "ties" to a commissioner produces some compromises.
It is less obvious, however, whether the compromises produce better deci-
sions. In fact, largely as a result of the need to accommodate disparate
views, FCC decisions have become formulaic, typically reveal very little
of the Commission's "thinking," and offer little by way of insight into un-
derlying philosophy. They consist of a lengthy section summarizing the
positions taken by the parties followed by a typically shorter statement es-
tablishing the Commission's position. They serve primarily as announce-
ments of the action taken, rather than well-reasoned statements of princi-
ple.37 Precisely because the outcome is often the product of a last-minute
consensus, the decisions are often a patchwork of pieces, each intended to
satisfy some (internal or external) interest. Granting the staff "editorial
privileges" following adoption of an item has become a euphemism for
stitching together the necessary pieces after the fact.
The deterioration of decision making at the FCC is also apparent in
the declining quality of dissenting opinions. At one time, dissents were
logical, well-written, scholarly opinions which reflected clear philosophi-
cal differences with the majority (usually chairman-driven) position. 38 To-
the Commission functioned with only three members. During this period, the Chairman was
ostensibly able to exercise more control, since he needed only one additional vote to pro-
duce his favored result. However, at the same time, each of the other two commissioners
had greater bargaining power as well. While it is difficult to judge whether the resulting
decisions were any better, the FCC certainly was able to function effectively with fewer
than the full complement of commissioners.
37. Judge Posner observed of the Commission's decision to revise the financial interest
and syndication rules:
The Commission's majority opinion. .. is long, but much of it consists of
boilerplate, the recitation of the multitudinous parties' multifarious contentions,
and self-congratulatory rhetoric about how careful and thoughtful and measured
and balanced the majority has been in evaluating those contentions and carrying
out its responsibilities. Stripped of verbiage, the opinion, like a Persian cat with
its fur shaved, is alarmingly pale and thin.
Schurz Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 982 F.2d 1043, 1050 (7th Cir. 1992).
38. An example of such a dissent was Commissioner Glen Robinson's scathing indict-
ment of the FCC's comparative license renewal process. See Cowles Fla. Brdcst., 60
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day, dissents are largely statements of disagreement with the majority and
are often simply scripts of comments made at the FCC's open meetings
(which are, themselves, neatly choreographed events rather than occasions
for genuine give-and-take).
By contrast, decisions rendered by a single administrator are likely to
reflect a clear philosophy, be internally consistent, and present a more
logical policy roadmap. A single administrator has nowhere to hide. There
is no internal consensus to build or deal to cut.40
But, if multimember commissions tend to water down good policies,
can they not water down bad policies as well?; that is, serve as a check on
a single administrator who may be inclined to "do the wrong thing?" The
answer is: "Of course." The analysis, however, cannot stop there.
In the first place, checks and balances are worthwhile, if they truly
check abuses and offset the power of vested interests. They may be worth
little, if they serve largely to prevent needed reforms and become a means
of extracting some unwarranted governmental favor.4' Moreover, the in-
cremental value of any particular set of checks and balances depends on
F.C.C.2d 372,430-433, 37 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1487 (1973).
39. The Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 2, 90 Stat. 1241
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1994)), was enacted in 1976. In essence, the Act requires fed-
eral agencies headed by boards (two or more persons) appointed by the President to open
"every portion of every meeting" to the public unless there is a valid reason for closing
them. Whatever benefits the Sunshine Act may have produced, it has virtually eliminated
Commission meetings as a meaningful part of the decision-making process. Points of con-
tention are no longer debated in public, but are resolved prior to meetings in closed sessions
of Commission staff or even by notation (or "on circulation" in the parlance of the FCC) in
part to avoid the notice and other procedural requirements of open meetings. FCC meetings
involve virtually no collegial interaction and have no bearing on the outcome. Replacing the
Commission with a single administrator, and thereby removing the agency from the re-
quirements of the Sunshine Act with respect to open meetings, would be a long-overdue
acknowledgment that this particular "emperor" has no clothes. Indeed, the deterioration in
decision making may well be adequate grounds for repealing the Sunshine Act altogether.
40. This also produces greater accountability, as discussed in Part llI.C.
41. One penetrating analysis put it this way:
By definition, government's power to solve problems comes from its abil-
ity to reassign resources, whether by taxing, spending, regulating, or simply
passing laws. But that very ability energizes countless investors and entrepreneurs
and ordinary Americans to go digging for gold by lobbying government. In time,
a whole industry-large, sophisticated, professionalized, and to a considerable
extent self-serving--emerges and then assumes a life of its own. This industry is a
drain on the productive economy, and there appears to be no natural limit to its
growth. As it grows, the steady accumulation of subsidies and benefits, each de-
fended in perpetuity by a professional interest group, calcifies government. Gov-
ernment loses its capacity to experiment and so becomes more and more prone to
failure.
JONATHAN RAUCH, DEMOsCLERosIs: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN GovERNmENT 17
(1994).
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what others exist.
In the case of the FCC, it can be argued that there is a surfeit of due
process-in fact, an infinitely elastic supply of legal process, or what one
FCC commissioner termed "undue process."'42 The seeming preoccupation
with process over progress is difficult to defend. The result is that a num-
ber of genuinely efficiency-enhancing reforms have been all but impossi-
ble to achieve. Indeed, a multimember commission is often faced with the
"prisoners' dilemma." Regulators might all be inclined to agree that a po-
litically difficult step is worth taking in the same way that prisoners might
agree that it would be best not to confess. The problem is that if one nev-
ertheless confesses/opposes taking the controversial step, there are power-
ful incentives compelling the others to go along. United they stand; di-
vided they fall. A single administrator cannot be divided in this sense and
may thus be more likely to make wise but politically unpopular decisions.3
The putative benefit of multimember commissions is precisely that
they thwart effectiveness-they compel compromise and sacrifice of prin-
ciple. Rule makings become exercises in mollifying competing internal
factions or "cutting a deal."'4 From the standpoint of trying to effect
change, this putative benefit is a disability precisely because it thwarts ef-
fectiveness. A well-conceived governance structure should certainly em-
body safeguards to ensure that good decisions are made and bad decisions
are avoided. There appear to be ample safeguards already in place in the
form of judicial review, legislative oversight, executive branch budget
authority, and press scrutiny to constrain a single administrator without
42. See Why Is This Trip Necessary? Regular Americans Should Be Interested, TELCO
COMPEnTiON REP., Aug. 1, 1996.
43. There is a big difference between expression of policy differences at the policy-
making level (i.e., the legislature) and at the regulatory level, where established policies are
administered. While the FCC has historically viewed its "quasi-legislative role" expan-
sively, the Commission's primary responsibilities currently consist of implementing policy
established by Congress in the 1996 Act.
44. Judge Posner, in Schurz Communications, Inc. v. FCC, said of the Commission's
treatment of the financial interest and syndication rules:
The impression created is of unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg com-
plexity among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants
who have somehow to be conciliated. The Commission said that it had been
"confronted by alternative views of the television programming world so starkly
and fundamentally at odds with each other that they virtually defy reconcilia-
tion." The possibility of resolving a conflict in favor of the party with the stronger
case, as distinct from throwing up one's hands and splitting the difference, was
overlooked.
Schurz Comm., 982 F.2d 1043, 1050 (7th Cir. 1992) (quoting Evaluation of the Syndication




having to incur the costs of a multimember commission. 4' By way of anal-
ogy, if a car is already equipped with a variety of safety features, does it
make sense to throw sand in the gears to prevent it from going too fast or
operating too efficiently?
C. Independence and Accountability
The goals of independence and accountability are, of course, some-
what in conflict. As an "independent" agency, the FCC is expected to
make decisions based on its expert judgment, without undue influence by
the White House, Congress, or the regulated industries. At the same time,
the FCC should be accountable for its decisions. Congress must be able to
ascertain whether a particular FCC decision is consistent with the statute
and with public policy. The courts must be able to discern the reasoned ba-
sis for Commission decisions, if those decisions are to be sustained.
46
From either perspective, the single-regulator model prevails over the
multimember commission. Precisely because the decisions made by mul-
timember commissions are compromises, responsibility is diffused and ac-
countability undermined. When called to account by Congress, the Presi-
dent, or the public, the chairman is inclined to defend an outcome as "the
best we could do under the circumstances" rather than "this is what, in my
judgment, was called for."
As noted previously, FCC decisions themselves are often opaque. It
is often difficult to discern a rationale or underlying philosophy other than
an effort to give everybody something (a result exacerbated by the mul-
timember decision making). Oversight of the agency tends to be entirely
45. This reform proposal would leave the protections of the Administrative Procedures
Act in place. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1994). Although some changes in the APA may be desirable
in their own right (note the concern that excessive due process thwarts efficient decision
making), the absence of similar formal protections in countries such as the U.K. is not to be
emulated, especially in the aftermath of the WTO Agreement on Trade in Telephone Serv-
ices, which calls for openness, transparency, and accountability in the regulatory process.
See GATS Reference Paper, 36 I.L.M. 367 (1997) (This document's procompetitive regu-
latory principles were adopted (in whole or substantial part) by 65 World Trade Organiza-
tion Member Countries on February 15, 1997.).
46. There are problems with both independence and accountability when the FCC be-
comes the target of too much pressure from too many contending factions. While 20 years
ago congressional oversight of the FCC involved primarily answering to the Commerce and
Appropriations Committees, the Commission today is the target of inquiries and demands
from a growing number of individual legislators, congressional caucuses, etc. See Harry M.
Shooshan I et. al., Legislating Conduct at the FCC: Congress and the FCC Authorization
Process, BRDCST. FIN. J., March-April 1989; Harry M. Shooshan III & Erwin G. Krasnow,
Congress and the Federal Communications Commission: The Continuing Contest for
Power, 9 COMM/ENT 819 (1987); Erwin G. Krasnow & Harry M. Shooshan I, Congres-
sional Oversight: The Ninety-Second Congress and the Federal Communications Commis-
sion, 10 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 297 (1973), reprinted in 26 FED. COMM. B. J. 81 (1973).
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political, that is, a response to interest groups, which perceive they have
not gotten enough.47 A single administrator will still seek compromises
among contending factions, but will be more likely to impose his or her
own views as to certain core principles.45
From the standpoint of independence, a multimember commission
may be more favorable, although its independence is achieved in a rather
perverse way and at considerable cost. Because, as noted earlier, individual
FCC commissioners often owe their appointments to a particular politician
or interest group, their votes tend to be heavily influenced accordingly. In
fact, with a multimember commission, this is the expected result. This re-
sult is tolerable because the expectation is that, at least at the margin, these
competing influences will cancel each other out. The question remains
whether the risks avoided are worth the costs incurred (larger budget, less
efficient decision making, diminished accountability, etc.). The answer
also depends on how serious the potential liabilities of a single adminis-
trator are on this score.
There is a potentially greater risk that the FCC would not be as inde-
pendent, if it were headed by a single administrator. 4' In theory, a single
administrator could be more easily corrupted; that is, unduly influenced by
political pressures or industry favors. For example, in the renewal of li-
censes 50 or enforcement of the political broadcasting rules,5 'a single ad-
47. In this environment, the first principle is "I want more," and the second is "More is
not enough."
48. As an example, compare the local competition decisions of the FCC with those of
the U.K.'s Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL). The FCC's interconnection order
sought to be all things to all people; that is, to ensure big discounts for resellers of local
service and uneconomically low prices for unbundled network elements. Implementation of
the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 FCC Rcd. 15,499, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1, clarified by Order on Reconsidera-
tion, 11 FCC Rcd. 13,042, 4 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 1057, reconsideration denied by Second
Order on Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd. 19,738, 5 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 420 (1996), va-
cated in small part by Third Order on Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 8 Comm. Reg. 1206 (1997) (further reconsideration pending). As a result, the
FCC's "policy" may actually have undercut facilities-based competition. Key elements of
this order were overturned by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC,
120 F.3d 753 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. granted sub. nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 118
S. Ct. 879 (1998). OFTEL's approach has been consistently to promote facilities-based lo-
cal competition. Only facilities-based providers are eligible for resale discounts and OFTEL
has declined to order BT to unbundle its loops. Whether or not one agrees with OFTEL's
philosophy or thinks it is relevant to local markets in the U.S., it is clearly discernable and
consistently applied. See Harry M. Shooshan III, Troubling Ironies and Inconsistencies:
The MCI/BT Merger (Feb. 25, 1997) <http://www.spri.com/reports/publist.htm>.
49. It should be emphasized that the restructuring proposed in this Article envisions the
FCC as an independent agency; that is, free from direct control of any other executive
branch department.
50. See New Watergate Tapes Show Nixon Considering Attacks on Post Licenses,
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ministrator at the FCC might be inclined to advance the political agenda of
the President to whom he owes his appointment. He might be more in-
clined to curry favor with a powerful legislator by acting to stifle contro-
versial speech (e.g., obscenity and indecency).
These are serious concerns that deserve consideration. Ultimately, the
question is whether these concerns warrant a multimember Commission
(with all of its associated short-comings) or suggest other necessary re-
forms. This assessment, moreover, must be made in the context of the
modem FCC.
In the first place, the likelihood of abuse in the licensing process has
been greatly reduced by the introduction of auctions as a means for
awarding licenses, including (for the first time) new broadcast licenses."
Elimination of the public interest standard for license renewals (or elimi-
nating the license renewal process altogether) would reduce the opportu-
nity for subjective interpretation and potential abuse. In the absence of
such reforms, the best internal check against future abuses in the licensing
process is the same as it has been in the past-the existence of a cadre of
career professionals who can be expected to resist inappropriate interven-
tion by a commissioner.
Similarly, to the extent that political broadcasting laws and rules are
retained, they should be administered by career professionals under dele-
gated authority (much as they are today). If this degree of insulation is
considered inadequate, review of such matters by the agency head could be
formally limited in some manner. Alternatively, enforcement of political
broadcasting rules could be transferred to the Federal Elections Commis-
sion.
Regulation of other aspects of speech by licensees of broadcast sta-
tions (e.g., obscenity and indecency) should be left to the courts.53 From a
COMM. DAILY, Jan. 6, 1998.
51. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.1920 (1996) (Personal Attacks), § 73.1930 (1996) (Political
Editorials) and § 73.1941 (1996) (Equal Opportunities).
52- See Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 3003, 111 Stat. 251, 265.
53. In fact, there are several examples of the FCC taking steps on its own to eliminate
regulation of speech. In 1983, the FCC cited constitutional concerns for broadcasters in its
repeal of several "underbrush" policies affecting programming and various commercial
practices, preferring instead to rely on market forces to control broadcast abuse. Elimination
of Unnecessary Brdcst. Reg., Policy Statement and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1043 (1983). More importantly, in 1987, the FCC abolished the Fair-
ness Doctrine, which required broadcasters to both cover "controversial issues of public
importance" and to afford a "reasonable opportunity" to air contrasting views. Syracuse
Peace Council v. WTVI-, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 63 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 541 (1987). For a
discussion of these actions, see Erwin G. Krasnow & Jack N. Goodman, The "Public Inter-
est" Standard: The Search for the Holy Grail, 50 FED. CoMM. L.J. 603, 617-18 (1998).
Number 3)
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL
public policy perspective, it is hard to justify regulating the speech of those
entities that are subject to the FCC's jurisdiction differently from the
speech of those which are not. 4
In sum, while there is increased risk of "corruption" with a single
administrator, there are corresponding precautions that can be taken to re-
duce that risk,55 many of which are also consistent with scaling back and
redeploying FCC resources to carry out its new mandate.
IV. THE U.K. MODEL
The single-administrator model was adopted in the United Kingdom
in connection with the privatization of a number of state-owned monopo-
lies, including British Telecom (BT).56 By most accounts, it has worked
well.
Under the 1984 Telecommunications Act, primary regulatory respon-
sibility was given to the Director General of Telecommunications (DGT),
supported by the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL) which essen-
tially performs the same functions as the career professional staff (as op-
posed to political appointees) at the FCC. Other important functions are
lodged with the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry (which is
roughly comparable to the U.S. Department of Commerce) and the Office
of Fair Trading. For example, the Secretary of State issues the licenses
which the DGT is charged with enforcing. The DGT is appointed by the
Secretary of State for a specified term and is directly accountable to Par-
liament. The DGT has extensive advisory support, including six independ-
ent advisory committees (e.g., Small Business, Disabled, and Elderly) and
54. The traditional rationales for the regulation of broadcasters are that (1) spectrum is
scarce, and (2) broadcasting has greater impact than other media. See Red Lion Brdcst. Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). Today, with
1,563 television and 12,227 radio stations, when 66% of households subscribe to cable
television, and when viewership of broadcast television is declining, it is difficult to sustain
these rationales. By the Numbers, BRDCST. & CABLE, Jan. 26, 1998, at 85.
55. The best course would be to limit the agency's jurisdiction in politically sensitive
areas as suggested and give the President the same rights enjoyed with most other nonjudi-
cial appointees. If Congress finds this approach too radical and contrary to its concept of the
FCC as an independent agency (after all, the first question with independence is:
"independence from whom?"), the agency head could be appointed to a single, four-year
term subject to removal only for cause. (It should be noted that the last five FCC chairmen
have served for an average of four years in that position and that it is highly unusual for
someone to stay on as a commissioner after being replaced as chairman by a new President.)
56. The U.K. opted for sector-specific regulation, creating a single administrator for
telecommunications, gas, electric, and water. Another model would have been that em-
ployed by states in the U.S. which typically have established one agency to regulate all
utilities. Note that the U.K. is comparable in land mass to the state of Oregon, while it has
about the same population density as the state of Massachusetts.
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several expert panels consisting of leading academics, consumers, and
business representatives.
Government policy in the U.K. is established differently than in the
U.S. model in that "the Government" has more direct control. For exam-
ple, much of the current telecom policy framework in the U.K. was set out
in a 1991 White Paper issued by the Government.57 Another significant dif-
ference in the two regimes is that much of the DGT's authority derives not
from a general statute, but rather from enforcement of the various
"licences" which are, in effect, agreements between the government and
the private parties (e.g., BT), embodying certain obligations and commit-
ments. Disputes over the DGT's interpretation and enforcement of a par-
ticular license or over proposed license amendments may be referred to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission. Until now, there has been very lit-
tle judicial review of government decisions, since the U.K. lacks a tradi-
tion of parties appealing regulatory decisions to the courts. 8
While the overall structure of government in the U.K. differs from
that of the U.S., the single-administrator model has produced admirable
results.59 The DGT described the benefits of this framework in a submis-
sion to the government as part of its current review of utility regulation.
These benefits include:
" An ability to balance the conflicting interests of consumers
and shareholders, and of competitors and incumbents in a
manner which transcends the short-term political pressures
faced by the "Government of the day;"
* The ability to establish consistent policy and create a stable
57. U.K. DEP'T OF TRADE AND IND., COMPErON AND CHOICE: TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY FOR THE 1990S (1991).
58. A notable exception was a successful challenge by Mercury Communications to the
DGT's interpretation of a clause in BT's license relating to the cost standard to be used in
setting interconnection prices. See Mercury Comm. Ltd. v. Director Gen. of Telecomm.
[1996] 1 W.L.R. 48 (H.L. 1995).
59. One result has been to promote the selection of an extremely well-qualified indi-
vidual as DGT. Don Cruickshank, who resigned as DGT on March 31, 1998, is an account-
ant with an MBA who served as a business consultant, a newspaper executive, the Manag-
ing Director of Virgin Group PLC (with supervision of the company's entertainment,
media, airline, and travel business), and Chief Executive of the National Health Service in
Scotland. The newly appointed DGT, David Edmonds, was a Managing Director for Nat-
West Group. Mr. Edmonds was responsible for an investment portfolio of £2.8 billion, 20
business units, and a staff of over 2,000. He was previously Chief Executive of the housing
Corporation and held several senior civil service posts. See David Edmonds, Director Gen-
eral of Telecommunications, Biographical Note (visited April 11, 1998)
<http://www.oftel.gov.uk/dgbio498.htm>. In short, the DGT's credentials are more like
those of a top member of the U.S. Cabinet than an FCC commissioner.
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and predictable regulatory climate so that investment com-
mitments can be made; and
0 The ability to promote competition and protect consumers
in markets where competition does not exist.
Guided by the DGT, OFTEL has established a much clearer, consis-
tent policy for the introduction of competition. For example, OFTEL has
consistently sought to encourage facilities-based competition, rather than
relying on resale and on using piece-parts of the networks of the incum-
bent (i.e., BT). OFTEL sees such "infrastructure competition" as essential
to its ability ultimately to withdraw from regulation of the telecommuni-
cations industry. OFTEL has also been much more explicit about the need
for achieving an efficient rate structure and, not surprisingly, has been
much more successful in achieving one than has the FCC.6' By comparison
to the opaque, formulaic FCC decisions, an OFTEL document is a lucid
policy roadmap. One might disagree with the destination arrived at by
OFTEL, but it is much easier to understand how they got there.
The U.K. model has not been without its recent critics. One respected
commentator was led to support the multimember "American-style" com-
mission out of concern that, with a single administrator, "[p]olicy becomes
obscured by personality; mano-a-mano confrontations replace reasoned
decisions." 62 While decisions may be more easily perceived (or cast by the
press and affected industries) in such terms (in the U.K. there is, admit-
tedly, only the DGT to blame), close observers of the American scene
must find it remarkable how often the priorities of multimember commis-
63
sions are viewed as the results of "the personal agenda" of the chairman.
In either case, press perception and "spin" by the parties seem like weak
arguments for one model or the other.64
60. DIRECTOR GEN. OF TELECOMM., REVIEW OF UTILITY REGULATION 14-15 (Sept.
1997) [hereinafter DGT SUBMISSION].
61. The FCC's job is admittedly complicated by the fact that it must share rate-setting
responsibility with state commissions, while OFTEL has jurisdiction over long distance and
local rates. On the other hand, the FCC has been notably reluctant over the years to wade
into the turbulent political water of rate rebalancing-in part because of divisions among
commissioners. See generally supra text accompanying notes 38-40.
62. Irwin Stelzer, American Lessons for the Utility Regulators, LONDON SUNDAY
TIMES, July 20, 1997, at B10.
63. For example, under Reed Hundt, the FCC fought a series of pitched battles with
broadcasters over children's television, political advertising, and qualification of the public
interest standard. See The Hundtification of TV, BRDCST. & CABLE, July 8, 1996, at 62;
Chris McConnell, Hundt Pitches Kids Standards, BRDCST. & CABLE, Jan. 29, 1996, at 18.
64. Irwin Stelzer advances a more compelling critique of the U.K. approach to regula-
tion on process grounds. He expressed it well in his Institute of Economic Affairs Lecture
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It must also be noted that the DGT has himself recommended re-
placing individual regulators with multimember commissions. 6 While ac-
knowledging the potential disadvantages of a commission, the DGT sug-
gests that a multimember commission would be "more accountable,
provide more stability, and improve the quality of decision making. ' 6  He
also sees benefits from having decisions made in open meetings. 67
The DGT's recommendation must be considered in the proper con-
text. In the first place, the current occupant of that position has announced
that he will not seek reappointment from the new government when his
seven-year contract expires in 1998. It is widely acknowledged that he will
be "a hard act to follow." Second, his call for a commission is accompa-
nied by a call for greatly expanded authority for the telecommunications
regulator in the U.K., including new authority to set competition policy
and expanded authority over broadcasting. The latter recommendation may
be more politically palatable where it is not seen as further aggrandizing
the DGT. A commission, moreover, would have room for others, who
might be adversely affected by the transfer of authority to the proposed
new agency. Finally, the DGT's recommendation may square with the role
regulation will play in the U.K. but is clearly not transferable to the U.S.,
which already has two competition agencies in place and which has de-
fined a very clear role for the FCC as the primary implementor and ad-
ministrator of the 1996 Act."'
In sum, then, the merits of the DGT's recommendation should be
considered within the unique circumstances that exist in the U.K. at the
present time. His recommendation in no way diminishes the successes of
the single-administrator model in the U.K. to date or undermines the ar-
guments for reforms of the multimember commission model in the current
environment in the U.S.
on Regulation: "By rejecting America's open procedural model in favor of... 'the more
secretive British framework,' the Government has denied the regulatory process the public
credibility on which its success and acceptance crucially depend." Irwin M. Stelzer, Lessons
for UK Regulation from Recent US Experience, Lecture on Regulation for the Institute of
Economic Affairs (Dec. 7, 1995) (transcript on file with author). As long as the procedural
rights established by the APA and rules governing ex parte contacts are maintained, this
critique would be largely inapplicable to the single telecommunications regulator proposed
in this Article. Moreover, as noted earlier, the "kabuki theater" nature of FCC deliberations
in open meetings does little to enhance public credibility in the U.S. model.
65. DGT SUBMISSION, supra note 60, at 33.
66. Id. at 33-34.
67. Id. at 34.
68. It is also possible that the DGT has a model in mind other than the FCC per se. It
cannot be that he wants to emulate the FCC's open meetings as a means of improving deci-
sion making or enhancing transparency and accountability.
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V. CONCLUSION
The passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the debate
about the future of the FCC suggest that the time is right to reconsider the
Commission's structure. Reviews of the independent regulatory agencies
conducted since the FCC was created in 1934 have not seriously consid-
ered the alternative model proposed in this Article-a single administrator.
The advantages of a single administrator over a multimember com-
mission are substantial. Costs could be reduced. Decision making could be
improved. Positive accountability could be enhanced. The potential disad-
vantages of a single administrator should also be addressed by appropriate
changes in the FCC's jurisdiction, especially as it relates to broadcast li-
cense renewals and the political broadcasting rules. In general, if Congress
is concerned about limiting the discretion of the single administrator, it can
replace the Commission's "public interest" mandate with a more defined
set of responsibilities much as it has done with enactment of the 1996 Act.
The success of the single-administrator model in the U.K. should be
studied carefully. Under the direction of the DGT, OFTEL has, for exam-
ple, established a much clearer, more consistent policy for the introduction
of telecommunications competition. It has produced a much more stable
and predictable regulatory environment.
The restructuring advocated in this Article is a constructive alterna-
tive to the calls for elimination of the FCC and a return to the common
law. The FCC has been given an important job to do by the Congress in
implementing the 1996 Act. Congress should now seriously consider how
best to structure the FCC so that its job can be done as rapidly, efficiently,
and effectively as possible.
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